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III 
HI. INTRODUCTION 
Five issues were raised by the defendants in their briefing in support of affirming the 
Commission's Order on Reconsideration dated November 4,2013. First, the employer/surety raised 
quasi-estoppel as a new basis to affirm the Commission. This Court has repeatedly upheld the 
principle that review on appeal is limited to those issues raised at the Commission. For that reason, 
the defense of quasi-estoppel should be deemed waived. 
Second, the employer/surety concluded that Vawter was distinguishable from this case so 
that collateral estoppel remained a viable defense. This argument is based on the belief that because 
more than one complaint was filed, there is more than one cause of action at issue. This argument 
ignores the simple fact that the industrial accident on 10/4/08 provided the group of operative facts 
to casco As IS a 
cause of action rendering collateral estoppel inapplicable. See Vawter V. United Parcel Service, 
Inc. 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 902 (2014). 
Third, the employer/surety concluded that it was permissible for the Commission to raise 
affirmative defenses sua sponte following trial. This argument ignores the Court's recent statement 
in Gomez v. Dura Mark, Inc., 152 Idaho 597, 601, 272 P.3d 569, 573 (2012) which stated that 
administrative tribunals are required to provide parties both a "fair notice" and a "full opportunity" 
to meet issues before raising them. In this case, by approving the lump sum settiement and then 
using that settlement as the basis to avoid deciding this case on the merits, the Commission failed 
to provide the claimant with fair notice or a full opportunity to meet the collateral estoppel 
defense and violated the claimant's right to due process. 
Fourth, all defendants to this appeal have argued that I.C. §72-719(3) is incapable of 
being utilized to modify a settlement agreement on the basis of manifest injustice when read in 
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conjunction I.C. §72-719(4). This is because I.e. §72-719(4) speaks of a prohibition on a 
commutation of payments under I.C. §72-404. However, I.C. §72-404 is ambiguous as to 
whether it applies to ISIF settlements as it only discusses discharging the liability of the 
employer via lump sum and does not reference the ISIF. Because Title 72 specifically 
differentiates the employer/surety from the ISIF, adopting the defendants view would require the 
Court to construe this ambiguous statute in favor of denying disability benefits to the claimant, 
vV'hich this Court has previously "'\'AJHLLv'-' to do. Sprague v. Inc., 116 
Idaho 720, 779 P.2d 395 (1989); Ogden v. Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). 
Finally, the ISIF argues that the ISIF settlement is not void pursuant to I.C. §72-
318(2),which prohibits an agreement by an employee which waives her rights to compensation 
tmder Title 72. ISIF argues that this case is distinguishable from the Wernecke case where a 
claimant entered into a void settlement with the ISIF by failing to satisfY the elements of ISIF 
liability. Similar to the claimant in Wernecke, the claimant in this case was also detemlined to not 
have met the elements of ISIF liability after a hearing on the merits. In such a scenario, just as the 
ISIF settlement in Wernecke was declared void, so to should the ISIF settlement in this case be 
declared void. Inexplicably and in contravention of its findings on the merits that the ISIF had no 
liability, the Commission then utilized the ISIF settlement agreement as a basis to withhold 
disability benefits from the claimant. As this Court stated in Wernecke, if a contract is illegal and 
void, the court will leave the parties as it finds them and refuse to enforce the contract. The contract 
carmot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel. Whitney v. Cant '/ Life & Accident Co., 
89 Idaho 96, 105,403 P.2d 573, 579 (1965). 
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IV. ARGUMENT 
1. THE DEFENSE OF QUASI ESTOPPEL HAS BEEN WAIVED 
Employer/Surety raised the affirmative defense of quasi-estoppel for the first time on 
appeal. This Court has repeatedly upheld the well established principle that review on appeal is 
limited to those issues raised in the lower tribunal. With few exceptions!, this Court will not 
address issues for first all v. Triangle Dairy Company Co., 109 
Idaho 858, 862, 712 P.2d 559, 563 (1986) citing Baldner v. Bennett's, Inc., 103 Idaho 458, 460, 
649 P.2d 1214, 1216 (1982); Webster v. Potlatch Forests, 68 Idaho 1, 16, 187 P.2d 527, 536 
(1947). See also ~Masters v. State, 105 Idaho 197, 668 P .2d 73 (1983) (parties are held to the 
theories on which a cause was tried in the lower court and may not raise additional or new 
theories on appeal); International Business Machines Corp. v. Lawhorn, 106 Idaho 194, 677 P .2d 
507 (Ct.App.l984) (even if issue was arguably raised in the lower tribunal under liberal 
interpretation of pleadings, if not supported by any factual showing or by submission of legal 
authority, it was not presented for lower comi's decision and would not be considered on 
appeal.) Because Employer/Surety limited their argument at the Commission exclusively to the 
affirmative defense of collateral estoppel, any quasi-estoppel defense has been waived. See Ex. 
Add. Doc 2 and 4. 
2. THE 10/4/08 ACCIDENT IS THE SOLE CAUSE OF ACTION IN THIS CASE 
Employer/Surety has concluded that there are two causes of action in this case because 
there was a separate complaint filed against the ISIF in relation to 10/4/08 accident. This 
1 The noted exceptions include issues regarding jurisdiction, failure to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted, and constitutional questions. 
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argument ignores the Court's rationale in Vawter that where a cause of action was defined as a 
"group of operative facts giving rise to one or more bases for suing; a factual situation that 
entitled one person to obtain a remedy in court from another person ... " Vawter v. United Parcel 
Service, Inc. 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 903 (2014). 
Collateral estoppel is inapplicable in cases like this one where the litigation, albeit 
including several different hearings, is nevertheless all part ofthe same case. See Sanije Berisha, 
Ie 2002-003038, 20]2 2118142 (Idaho Ind. Com. May 30, 2012). 
Employer/surety's argument on this issue is even contrary to the Commission's view of a cause 
of action which assigns a single case number to each industrial accident2, regardless of the 
whether the ISIF could be held liable in addition to the employer/surety. 
3. COMMISSION VIOLATED CLAIMANT'S DUE PROCESS 
Employer/Surety argues that it is permissible for the Commission to raise affirmative 
defenses sua sponte following trial. This is expressly contrary to the Commission's own 
statement that, "The Commission cannot decide issues that are not before it." Sherri Troutwine, 
Claimant, IC 2006,012796, 2009 WL 5850565 (Idaho Ind. Com. November 27, 2009). 
Moreover, this COUli has held that administrative tribunals are unable to raise issues without first 
serving an affected party with "fair notice" and a "full opportunity" to meet such issues. 
Hernandezv. Phillips, 141 Idaho 779,781,118 P.3d 111,113 (2005). 
In this case, by raising the affirmative defense of collateral estoppel after a decision on 
the merits had been issued on May 3, 2013, concluding apportionment issues were moot; the 
Commission violated the Claimant's right to due process. In this situation, the claimant lacked 
fair notice or full opportunity to meet this defense after settlement with the ISIF. R. p. 110. This 
2 The relevant Industrial Commission case number with respect to the 10/4/08 accident is 2008-032836. 
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is because claimant relied on the fact that affirmative defenses must be timely set forth in the 
notice of hearing pursuant to I.C. §72-713. Additionally, the pleading form that all defendants 
are required to use when answering a complaint in an industrial claim specifically requires that 
the employer/surety, "State with specificity what matters are in dispute and your reason for 
denying liability, ~~=:.....!.!.=:..!!!!.I-.:=~=~~==~ to avoid surprise at trial. R. p. 11. 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
Both defendants have argued that I.e. §72-719(3) is incapable of modifying a settlement 
agreement based on Harmon v. Lute's Const. Co., 112 Idaho 291(1986) absent proof of fraud. 
This conclusion makes little sense and would render I.C. §72-719(3) duplicative of I.C. §72-
7l9(1). Co., 1 700, 702, 662 P.2d 1144, 1145 (1983), the Court 
addressed a similar argument when the Commission refused to modify a settlement agreement 
based on a belief that a settlement agreement could only be reopened only, "Upon a showing of 
fraud or a change in condition." Id. The Court stated that the Commission was, "enoneously 
under the impression that the doctrine of res judicata precludes any consideration of the 
applicability of 1. C. § 72-719(3) in the absence of either fraud or a change of condition ... Here 
the statute clearly over-rides that concept of finality, permitting the Commission to reopen its 
earlier decision if it finds it necessary to do so to conect a manifest injustice. Id. 
Moreover, a reading of I.C. §72-719(4) states that, "This section shall not apply to a 
commutation of payments under section 72-404." However, a plain reading of I.e. §72-404 
reveals no discussion of the ISIF and instead speaks only of the, "liability of the employer." As 
the employer is specifically defined in I.C. §72-102(12)(a) as any person who has expressly or 
impliedly hired or contracted the services of another, the ISIF is excluded from a plain reading of 
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I.C. §n-404. The recent revision to I.C. §n-223(7) which expressly granted all the rights of the 
employer to the ISIF as well further clarifies that the legislature considers the ISIF a distinct 
entity from the employer. As such, because the ISIF settlement did not speak to the liability of 
the employer/surety, §n-719( 4) does not provide a bar to modification of the IsrF settlement. 
The provisions of the Workers Compensation law are to be liberally construed in favor of the 
employee. Sprague v. Caldwell Transportation, Inc., 116 Idaho no, 779 P.2d 395 (1989). The 
humane it serves no room narrow ,VVHUJ"'CU construction. Ogden v. 
Thompson, 128 Idaho 87, 910 P.2d 759 (1996). 
IS VOID AS LAW 
Finally, ISIF argues that the ISIF settlement is not void because claimant did not waive 
her rights to benefits under Title 72. However the plain text of I.e. §72-318 states that, "No 
agreement by an employee to waive his rights to compensation under this act shall be valid." 
ISIF argues that this case is distinguishable from the Wernecke case where a claimant entered into a 
void settlement with the ISIF by failing to satisfy the elements of ISIF liability. Similar to the 
claimant in Wernecke, the claimant in this case was also detennined to not have met the elements of 
ISIF liability after a hearing on the merits. 
In such a scenario, just as ISIF settlement in Wernecke was declared void for failing to meet 
elements of ISIF liability, so to should the ISIF settlement in this case be declared void. This is in 
keeping with similar cases which found that agreements in violation of public policy are void. 
A10rtimer v. Riviera Apartments, 122 Idaho 839, 840 P.2d 383 (1992). As this Court stated in 
Wernecke, if a contract is illegal and void, the court will leave the parties as it finds them and refuse 
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to enforce the contract. The contract cannot be treated as valid by invoking waiver or estoppel. 
Whitney v. Cant 'I Life & Accident Co., 89 Idaho 96, 105,403 P.2d 573,579 (1965). 
6. ATTORNEY FEES SHOULD BE AWARDED ON APPEAL 
Attorney fees are awarded on appeal in an industrial case if the court detennines that the 
employer or his surety contested a claim for compensation made by an injured employee without 
grounds to I.e. §72-804. case, employer/surety has raised 
the same arguments previously ruled upon in Vawter v. United Parcel Service, Inc. 155 Idaho 903, 
318 P.3d 893, 903 (2014). In reviewing Vawter, the undersigned is unable to appreciate any 
discernible difference in the arguments put forward by the employer/surety in that case and the 
arguments put forward by the employer/surety in this case. As such, the arguments now being 
advanced by the surety have previously been detemlined to be without merit. 
V. CONCLUSION 
It is the policy of worker's compensation statutes to encourage "sure and certain relief for 
injured workers." I.e. §72-201. It should be remembered that until Jackman v. State of Idaho, 
Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 129 Idaho 689, 951 P.2d 1207 (1997), utilizing a settlement 
agreement as a basis for collateral estoppel was not permitted at the Commission. See Gay 
Wheeler, Claimant, IC No. 93-844411, 1996 WL 938429 (Idaho Ind. Com. Oct 7, 1996). 
Regardless, because there is but a single cause of action in this case stemming from the 
10/4/08 accident, collateral estoppel cannot be applied in this case anymore than it could be in 
the Sanije Berisha, Claimant, IC 2002-003038, 2012 WL 2118142 (Idaho Ind. Com. May 30, 
2012) case referenced in Vawter. Even if it could be said that the 10/4/08 accident gave rise to 
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more than one cause of action, the settlement agreement at issue in this case was not the product 
of actual litigation and was certainly not a final judgment on the merits for the reasons discussed 
extensively in claimant's opening brief. Finally, even assuming that the above theories are all 
incorrect, the ISIF settlement has now been determined to be void by virtue of the May 3, 2013, 
decision post-trial where it was determined that the ISIF had no liability. R. pp. 81-111. As 
discussed above, where a settlement is violative of public policy for failure to satisfy the 
of liability, it be 
In conclusion, the claimant would ask this court to specifically overrule Jackman and 
clarify that Tagg v. State of Idaho, ISIF, 123 Idaho 95, 844 P.2d 1345 (1993) and Vawter v. 
United Parcel Service, Inc. 155 Idaho 903, 318 P.3d 893, 903 (2014) properly set forth the law in 
Idaho. Based on the argument presented herein, the Commission's prior detennination that 
collateral estoppel is applicable to this case should be reversed and the case remanded back to the 
Commission so that the May 3, 2013, order assessing total and permanent disability benefits 
against the surety is reinstated. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTTED this 18th day of April, 2014. 
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«~~~Stephen Nemec, ISB No. 7591 
Attorney for Claimant-Appellant 
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Law Offices of Kent W. Day Jones , Brower & Callery 
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Attorney for Employer & Surety Attorney for I.S.I.F. 
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Overnight Mail Ovemight Mail 
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